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Abstract 
Promoting competition in contracting has been a focus of Department of Defense (DoD) 
efforts for many years, but this focus has heightened in recent years as defense budgets 
have declined dramatically. Though there has been much written about the results of these 
efforts, most of the literature has focused on rates of competition for the DoD overall. In 
previous work on DoD contracting, however, the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies (CSIS) has found that competition rates vary not just on what is being purchased, but 
by who in the DoD is doing the purchasing. 
This research effort builds upon previous CSIS work on defense contracting, using publicly 
available data from the Federal Procurement Data System. The study team has undertaken 
to build a predictive model of defense contracting, identifying factors that correlate with higher 
or lower rates of effective competition, and using data from past years to generate an 
“expected” rate of competition. With this model, CSIS digs a step deeper by examining trends 
in competition by Place of Performance (states) and by Major Contracting Command. The 
findings from this analysis are used to generate an improved predictive model, which is 
previewed in this report 
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Introduction1 
The Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group at the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies (CSIS) has completed the work detailed in this paper as an intermediate effort for a 
larger study being conducted for the Naval Postgraduate School. The following paper details 
the structure of the team’s efforts to create a predictive model of the degree of effective 
competition in defense contracting. Our team defines effective competition as all contracts 
that solicit two or more bids. CSIS believes that effective competition is the best metric to 
measure whether the DoD is successfully promoting competition, as it excludes 
competitively-sourced contracts that receive only one offer. The final product of this research 
effort will delve deeper into the issue of single-offer competition, but the study team believes 
that many cases of single-offer competition never had a chance of getting more than one 
offer. 
The purpose of the model described in this paper is to better understand the extent 
to which different factors in defense contracting influence effective competition in the bidding 
process. This effort is an important addition to the literature on defense competition, as it 
quantifies the correlative effects of different factors through a statistically rigorous analysis. 
Numerous statements from officials inside the DoD and throughout the federal government 
have emphasized the importance of promoting competition, particularly in a difficult budget 
environment, as a way to improve quality and reduce cost. 
The larger study analyzes competition via a range of approaches. Earlier, under this 
research effort, the study team reported on levels of effective competition for the military 
departments and then disaggregated the effective competition rates for products, services, 
and R&D.2 This approach allows for trend analysis to see whether rates are improving or 
degrading under Better Buying Power and during sequestration. That paper found that while 
recent reports from the Government Accountability Office found reduced competition, 
effective competition rates have held steady in aggregate despite the pressures of 
sequestration. The paper also found that while rates of effective competition for products, 
services, and R&D have been remarkably consistent over time for the DoD as a whole, 
those rates differ significantly between major DoD components. In particular, there are 
notable differences between the major DoD components in rates of effective competition for 
similar categories of products, services, and R&D, which is an issue that the study team 
intends to delve into further in the next stages of this study. 
The primary focus of this study is one level deeper: Major Contracting Commands 
and U.S. states. By aggregating the data at this level, the study team can look for signs of 
weakness in the industrial base on a geographical and a functional basis. The utility of this 
study is to go beyond obvious findings, such as low levels of competition for complex 
defense specific systems, to instead look at which states and Major Commands are over- or 
underperforming expectations. To do that, it was first necessary for CSIS to set a baseline of 
what to expect.  
                                            
 
 
1 CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed in this presentation 
should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). 
2 Available at http://csis.org/publication/quality-competition-defense-contracts-under-better-buying-
power  
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To set that baseline, the first phase of this study analyzed, in isolation, the 
relationship between a variety of contract characteristics and the level of competition 
through the number of offers. The evaluated characteristics include the following: 
 Type of Good Procured: Products, Services, and Research & Development 
(R&D) 
 Platform Portfolios: Land, Air, Vessel, Missiles and Space, Electronics & 
Communications, and Weapons and Ammunition 
 Contracting Methods: Contract Pricing, Contract Size, and Contract Vehicle 
Due to the large number of commands and U.S. states, the results from that first 
phase are available at the Competition repository of the CSIS defense GitHub account.3 
This collection includes scatter plots for each study variable as well as the annual 
competition rates for each major command and U.S. state.  
After examining the influence of contract characteristics in isolation, CSIS proceeded 
to study their interaction on two separate but mutually reinforcing tracks. The first track was 
to develop a regression model which used the same units of analyses as the first phase: 
major commands and states. For each geographical and organizational unit, the study team 
calculated the percentage of obligations that aligned with each contract characteristic using 
a denominator of constant obligations from fiscal year (FY)2000 to FY2013. As is discussed 
below, not every characteristic could be included, because of correlation. Products and 
services inversely correlate with one another while Missiles and Space correlates positively 
with R&D, but the team chose those contract traits which had the highest explanatory value 
and a clear causal mechanism. 
On a parallel track, the team took advantage of a Bayesian model developed for a 
separate research project on fixed price contracting. That model uses individual contracts, 
rather than major commands or U.S. states as the unit of analysis and allows for use of the 
entire dataset of publicly reported DoD contracts completed between FY2007 and FY2013. 
This larger sample approach can yield more statistical power and is well suited to examining 
the causal connections between variables in addition to looking at how those connections 
influence the outcome.  
In addition to studying and putting in place enhanced statistical methods, the CSIS 
team has been working to ensure that our work will be fully reproducible by future 
researchers who seek to cross-validate and build upon our results. This goes beyond the 
aforementioned publishing of the competition data for each U.S. state and major command 
and work that was completed in the fall of 2014 comparing the level of effective competition 
for each individual variable. The study team has also published the lookup tables used to 
classify the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS) competition data, the regression 
model building process, and the Bayesian model and analysis. 
This paper outlines our efforts in four parts:  
 Modeling DoD Effective Competition Rates Using Regression, wherein 
we detail our model and its variables;  
                                            
 
 
3 Available at http://github.com/CSiSdefense/competition  
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 Examination of Outlier Major Commands and U.S. states, which 
demonstrates the capabilities of the CSIS model by comparing the actual 
effective rate of competition with the predicted rate of competition on a select 
group of major commands and states of interest;  
 Tracing the Influence of Study Variables at the Contract Level, which 
takes a closer look at the independent variables included in the regression 
model and analyzes how they influence competition with assistance from a 
Bayesian network that uses contracts as a unit of analysis; and 
 Initial Results and Planned Next Steps. 
Modeling DoD Effective Competition Rates Using Regression 
In order to evaluate trends in effective competition in DoD contracting, CSIS has 
divided up DoD contracting activity in two ways: 
 Place of Performance: This breakdown examines in which state a contract is 
to be performed. This is done by using each state as an observation and 
aggregating the data from each state for each variable over the time period 
from 2000 to 2013. This can provide indications of the vibrancy of the 
industrial base available to perform contracts activity that takes place within a 
particular state.4 
 Major Contracting Command (MCC): Going a level below the usual analytic 
level of “component,” this breakdown allows for analysis of how successful 
different major contracting commands have been in promoting effective 
competition relative to the goods or services for which they are contracting 
and the types of contracts for which they are responsible. This is done by 
using each MCC as an observation and aggregating the data from each MCC 
for each variable over the time period from 2000 to 2013. 
For these two data groups, CSIS has built a linear regression model in order to 
generate an “estimated” rate of effective competition for each state and MCC, along with a 
confidence interval. This model uses data from FY2000 to 2013 to generate a prediction of 
2014 effective competition rates, based on a number of variables (described in the 
introduction, and explained in detail in a later section), and what types of contracts are used. 
Each of these variables has been tested and validated as having a statistically significant 
correlation to either increasing or decreasing rates of effective competition.  
The “estimated” rate of effective competition is then compared to the actual rate of 
effective competition for FY2014. At this point, this predictive model is not intended to 
evaluate performance in promoting effective competition—the regression model is only 
capable of explaining about half of the variance in effective competition rates, and the 
confidence intervals for estimates were sufficiently wide as to include the vast majority of 
actual values for both models. CSIS is currently refining the model and considering 
                                            
 
 
4 Because the issues involved with competition for contracts performed overseas and/or in 
contingency environments are notably different than those for most domestically-performed contracts, 
contracts whose place of performance is outside the United States are excluded from the “place of 
performance” analysis. CSIS will consider whether and how foreign countries should be included for 
future iterations. 
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increasing the sample size by separating out the MCC and state entries by year. For the 
purposes of this analysis, results from the regression model are used to identify 
states/MCCs where the difference between “estimated” and actual effective competition 
rates is notable enough to warrant deeper investigation. 
Because there is some difference in the variables used to evaluate states versus 
those used for MCCs, the following discussion is divided into two sections, highlighting a 
selection of states/MCCs that the model suggests are worthy of further study. 
Major Command Regression 
The following variables have been evaluated as being part of a statistically significant 
causal model for competition in MCCs; however, significance varies across variables. 
 
Variables that correlate with a lower rate of effective competition: 
 Greater percentage of contract obligations related to Aircraft & Drone 
programs (pAir); Missiles and Space programs (pMnS); Weapons and 
Ammunition programs (pWnA); and Electronics & Communications programs 
(pEnC). 
 Greater mix of contract obligations for products and services 
(pService:pProduct). As the contracting portfolio becomes more mixed, rates 
of effective competition decrease. 
 Percentage of contract obligations for services and awarded under IDV 
contract types (pService:pIDV). Competition decreases when both increase. 
Variables that correlate with a higher rate of effective competition: 
 Greater percentage of contract obligations awarded under Indefinite Delivery 
Vehicle (IDV) contract types (pIDV). 
 Greater percentage of contract obligations awarded for services (pService). 
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 Greater mix of contracting obligations for products and services, along with 
greater percentage of contracts awarded under IDV contract types 
(pService:pProduct:pIDV). 
U.S. State Regression 
The following variables have been evaluated as being part of a statistically significant 
causal model for competition in U.S. states; however, significance varies across variables.  
 
Variables that correlate with a lower rate of effective competition: 
 Greater percentage of contract obligations awarded for products (pProduct) 
 Greater percentage of contract obligations related to Aircraft & Drone 
programs (pAir); Missiles & Space programs (pMnS); Ships programs 
(pVessel); and Electronics & Communications (E&C) programs (pEnC)5  
Variables that correlate with a greater rate of effective competition: 
 Greater percentage of contract obligations awarded under Indefinite Delivery 
Vehicle (IDV) contract types 
 Greater percentage of contract obligations awarded for both products and 
Electronics & Communications (pProducts:pEnC; competition increases when 
both increase) 
                                            
 
 
5 These groupings include all product, service, and R&D contracts associated with a particular class 
of platforms or programs. Where relevant, this analysis also references specific categories of 
products or services, but those categories are specifically noted to be only products or services when 
mentioned. 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ãW=
`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=`Ü~åÖÉ= - 323 - 
Examination of Outlier Major Commands and U.S. States 
After having created the predictive regression model and analyzed the causal roots 
of the variables that drive the model, the study team put these tools into practice to study 
FY2014 contracting. By applying the regression derived from FY2000 to FY2013 data to the 
FY2014 inputs, the study team estimated effective competition rates for each of the states 
and major commands in the sample for FY2014, and then compared the predicted value to 
the actual effective competition rate for each state or major command in FY2014. The intent 
of this process was to identify the organizational and geographical units that exemplify or 
defy DoD-wide patterns.  
At this stage of the research effort, the limits of the predictive strength of the model 
means that the following analysis is not intended to “grade” MCCs and states on their 
competition performance. Rather, the following sections are intended as a proof of concept 
for the study methodology, demonstrating the ability of the CSIS model to identify “outliers” 
among the MCCs and states. The drivers of the differences between actual and “estimated” 
effective competition rates for the identified states and MCCs will be used to improve future 
iterations of the CSIS predictive model. 
Major Contracting Commands6  
The following section describes five MCCs, four with significant levels of contract 
obligations that show notable differences between “estimated” effective competition rates 
and actual rates in 2014 and one MCC where “estimated” and actual rates are nearly 
identical. 
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Energy 
 Total 2014 Contract Obligations: $8.4 billion 
 “Estimated” 2014 Effective Competition Rate: 83% 
 Actual 2014 Effective Competition Rate: 94% 
DLA Energy exceeded its “estimated” competition rate in 2014 in part due to the 
unique mix of goods and services it contracts for, as well as higher than average effective 
competition rates for significant parts of its contracting portfolio.  
As would be expected, the vast majority of contract obligations by DLA Energy are 
for fuels. Approximately 96% of fuels contract obligations by DLA Energy are awarded after 
effective competition in 2014, right in line with the overall DoD rate of 95%. DLA Energy also 
handles significant contract obligations for facilities-related services and construction 
(FRS&C; primarily for lease and operation of fuel supply facilities, as well as utilities), and 
88% of those contract obligations were awarded after effective competition. By comparison, 
the rate of effective competition for overall DoD FRS&C contract obligations is 70%. Over 
92% of DLA Energy contract obligations are awarded under IDV contract types, which are 
associated with higher rates of effective competition. Most of the other correlative variables 
do not apply to DLA Energy, which may explain the gap between the “estimated” and actual 
effective competition rates. 
                                            
 
 
6 Because the 95% confidence intervals for the MCC model are so wide, no MCCs fell outside of their 
intervals. CSIS sees this not as a sign of the predictive power of the model, but rather a limitation to 
be addressed in future iterations. 
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DLA Aviation 
 Total 2014 Contract Obligations: $4.3 billion 
 “Estimated” 2014 Effective Competition Rate: 42% 
 Actual 2014 Effective Competition Rate: 20% 
DLA Aviation significantly underperformed its “estimated” effective competition rate in 
2014, due to lower than average rates of effective competition for Electronics & 
Communications, Facilities & Construction, and products categorized as “Engines & Power 
Plants.” 
Unsurprisingly, the majority of DLA Aviation contract obligations are for Aircraft & 
Drones, with a significant share also going for Electronics & Communications; both correlate 
to lower rates of effective competition. The DLA Aviation rate of effective competition for 
Aircraft & Drones contract obligations was low in 2014 (17%), but that is only slightly lower 
than the rate for Aircraft & Drones contracts in the DoD overall (21%). (Within Aircraft & 
Drones, only 12% of DLA Aviation contract obligations for products categorized as “Engines 
& Power Plants” were awarded after effective competition, compared to 37% for the DoD 
overall.) By contrast, the rate of effective competition for Electronics & Communications 
within DLA Aviation (22%) is significantly lower than the rate for the DoD overall (35%).  
Interestingly, while 73% of overall DoD contract obligations for products and services 
categorized as “Facilities & Construction” (F&C) are awarded after effective competition, that 
rate is only 36% for F&C contract obligations within DLA Aviation.  
Army Materiel Command (AMC) 
 Total 2014 Contract Obligations: $43.6 billion 
 “Estimated” 2014 Effective Competition Rate: 34% 
 Actual 2014 Effective Competition Rate: 46% 
The main driver of AMC’s higher-than-“estimated” rate of effective competition in 
2014 is the unusually high rate of effective competition for one category of its services 
contracts portfolio. 
Based solely on the correlative variables for AMC, AMC’s effective competition rates 
being higher than “estimated” in 2014 seems unusual: a nearly even mix of products and 
services, as well as higher-than-average shares of obligations going to Aircraft & Drones 
and Electronics & Communications, correlate with lower rates of competition. The main 
driver of the higher-than-“estimated” rate of effective competition for AMC seems to be in the 
rate of effective competition for professional, administrative, and management support 
services (PAMS): PAMS account for nearly a quarter of AMC’s contract portfolio, and 66% 
were awarded after effective competition, compared to 36% for the DoD overall. 
Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) 
 Total 2014 Contract Obligations: $7.1 billion 
 “Estimated” 2014 Effective Competition Rate: 52% 
 Actual 2014 Effective Competition Rate: 33% 
The main drivers of the lower-than-predicted rate of effective competition are twofold. 
First, only 3% of NAVSUP contract obligations for Aircraft & Drones in 2014 were awarded 
after effective competition, compared to 21% for the DoD overall. Secondly, only 23% of 
NAVSUP contract obligations for Electronics & Communications were awarded after 
effective competition, compared to 45% for the DoD overall. 
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The relevant correlative variables for NAVSUP are a mixed bag: a relatively even 
mix of products and services, along with slightly higher-than-average shares of 
obligations going to Aircraft & Drones and Electronics & Communications, correlate 
with lower rates of effective competition. Meanwhile, higher-than-average usage of 
IDV contract types, especially alongside the aforementioned even mix of products 
and services, correlate with higher rates of effective competition. 
Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) 
 Total 2014 Contract Obligations: $36.7 billion 
 “Estimated” 2014 Effective Competition Rate: 30% 
 Actual 2014 Effective Competition Rate: 30% 
Unlike the previous four examples, where particular categories of contracts have 
significantly higher/lower rates of effective competition than the DoD overall in one direction, 
there are notable differences in both directions for AFMC. 
AFMC has a high percentage of contract obligations going to Aircraft & Drones 
(though, at 38%, not as high as one might assume), which correlates with lower rates of 
effective competition. AFMC also has a relatively even mix of products and services in its 
contracting portfolio, which similarly correlates with lower competition rates. Only 26% of 
AFMC contract obligations for PAMS in 2014 were awarded after effective competition, 
compared to 36% overall. By contrast, for AFMC equipment-related services (ERS), 33% of 
contract obligations were awarded after effective competition, compared to 26% overall. 
This lack of unidirectional deviations from “estimated” rates of competition is likely a 
significant factor enabling the predictive model to accurately estimate 2014 effective 
competition rates. 
Place of Performance—States 
The following sections describe four states with significant levels of contract 
obligations that show notable differences between “estimated” effective competition rates 
and actual rates in 2014, along with one state where “estimated” and actual rates are nearly 
identical. 
Minnesota 
 Total 2014 Contract Obligations: $3.9 billion 
 “Estimated” 2014 Effective Competition Rate: 65% 
 Actual 2014 Effective Competition Rate: 89% (Upper limit of 95% confidence 
interval: 89%) 
DoD contract obligations performed in Minnesota significantly over-performed their 
“estimated” effective competition rates, due to higher than average rates of effective 
competition for medical services.  
Only 19% of contract obligations for contracts performed in Minnesota were for 
products in 2014, compared to 45% for the DoD overall, which would correlate with higher 
rates of effective competition. At the same time, only 11% of contract obligations were 
awarded under IDV contract types, less than a quarter of the rate for the overall DoD, which 
would correlate with lower competition. Nearly 80% of obligations for contracts performed in 
Minnesota were for medical services, specifically “General Health Care Services.” 
Interestingly, nearly all of those medical services contract obligations were awarded after 
receiving only two offers; while the overall rate of competition is exceptional, this is not 
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necessarily indicative of a highly competitive marketplace. For overall DoD medical services 
contracting in 2014, approximately 75% of contract obligations were awarded after effective 
competition, with the vast majority of those receiving five or more offers. 
Mississippi 
 Total 2014 Contract Obligations: $2.3 billion 
 “Estimated” 2014 Effective Competition Rate: 44% 
 Actual 2014 Effective Competition Rate: 71% (Upper limit of 95% confidence 
interval: 67%) 
DoD contract obligations performed in Mississippi significantly outperformed their 
“estimated” effective competition rates, due to higher than average rates of effective 
competition for contracts related to Aircraft and Ships programs. 
A disproportionately large share (42%) of contract obligations performed in 
Mississippi in 2014 were related to Ships platforms, primarily related to construction of DDG-
51 destroyers at Ingalls Shipbuilding in Pascagoula, MS, owned by Huntington Ingalls 
Industries. Nearly three-quarters of Ships obligations were awarded after effective 
competition, almost entirely with only two offers, which is largely a function of the limited 
industrial base for large combat ships. Approximately 30% of contract obligations performed 
in Mississippi were related to Aircraft programs, which generally have low levels of effective 
competition, due to the limited industrial base for aircraft platforms, the long-term nature of 
aircraft programs, and the tendency for maintenance contracts to be performed by the 
development/production vendor. But the contract obligations in Mississippi, mainly for 
“maintenance–repair of aircraft,”7 were highly competitive, with nearly three-quarters 
awarded after effective competition, split relatively evenly between two offers and three or 
more offers.  
Nevada 
 Total 2014 Contract Obligations: $1.3 billion 
 “Estimated” 2014 Effective Competition Rate: 69% 
 Actual 2014 Effective Competition Rate: 41% (Lower limit of 95% confidence 
interval: 47%) 
DoD contract obligations performed in Nevada notably underperformed their 
“estimated” effective competition rates, primarily due to a lower than average rate of 
effective competition for one category of services. 
Contract obligations for contracts performed in Nevada are overwhelmingly IDV-type 
contracts (80%) in 2014, which correlate with higher levels of effective competition, and only 
24% of contracts are for products, which is well below the levels for the overall DoD. 
Nonetheless, the rate of effective competition for contracts performed in Nevada in 2014 is 
well below the “estimated” rate produced by the regression model and significantly below 
the lower limit of the 95% confidence interval. The main source of this low rate of 
competition seems to be an 18% effective competition rate for PAMS performed in Nevada, 
                                            
 
 
7 These obligations are likely related to Columbus Air Force Base, a major Air Force pilot training 
installation. 
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around half the rate seen for PAMS in the DoD overall; PAMS account for approximately 
40% of contract obligations performed in Nevada. Most of the obligations under PAMS are 
for “logistics support services.” 
Washington 
 Total 2014 Contract Obligations: $7.5 billion 
 “Estimated” 2014 Effective Competition Rate: 13% 
 Actual 2014 Effective Competition Rate: 45% (Upper limit of 95% confidence 
interval: 37%) 
DoD contract obligations performed in Washington state significantly over-performed 
their “estimated” effective competition rates in 2014, primarily due to higher than average 
rates of effective competition for contracts related to Aircraft programs and contracts for 
facilities-related services & construction. 
As would be expected from the home state of Boeing, a high share (66%) of 
obligations for contracts performed in Washington go to Aircraft & Drones programs, which 
are associated with lower rates of effective competition. A below-average share (26%) of 
Washington contract obligations are IDV-type contracts, which would also correlate with less 
competition. The source of the higher-than-“estimated“ rate of competition for contracts 
performed in Washington appears to be a higher-than-average rate of competition for 
Aircraft-related products: While only 10% of contract obligations for the DoD overall were 
awarded after effective competition in 2014, 35% of those contracts performed in 
Washington were awarded after effective competition.8  
FRS&C also makes up a significant share of contracts performed in Washington, and 
the data shows a highly competitive market: 88% of Washington FRS&C contract 
obligations were awarded after effective competition in 2014, compared to 70% for the DoD 
overall. And nearly 90% of the effectively competed FRS&C contracts performed in 
Washington received three or more offers. 
Virginia 
 Total 2014 Contract Obligations: $33.6 billion 
 “Estimated” 2014 Effective Competition Rate: 54% 
 Actual 2014 Effective Competition Rate: 55%  
Despite a higher than average rate of effective competition for a category of services 
that makes up a significant share of contract obligations performed in Virginia, the predictive 
model was able to almost exactly predict Virginia’s effective competition rate for 2014. 
Only 32% of obligations for contracts performed in Virginia were for products, 
compared to 41% overall, which would tend to correlate with higher rates of effective 
competition. Similarly, 67% of Virginia’s contract obligations were awarded under IDV 
contract types, notably higher than the rate for the DoD overall. As might be expected given 
                                            
 
 
8 Due to poor data labeling, the competed portion of Washington’s Aircraft contract obligations are 
labeled as being associated with the Shillelagh Missile, a 1970s Army anti-tank missile program. 
CSIS is engaging with experts to try to determine what program these contract obligations are 
actually associated with. 
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the volume of available vendors, the market for PAMS in Virginia is significantly more 
competitive than it is nationwide: 61% of PAMS contract obligations performed in Virginia 
were awarded after effective competition, compared to 36% nationwide.  
It is also notable that, for R&D contract obligations performed in Virginia, 36% 
awarded after competitions received only a single offer—over twice the rate for R&D 
nationwide. As a result, the rate of effective competition for R&D contracts performed in 
Virginia was only 32% in 2014, compared to 46% nationwide. Given the heavy concentration 
of major R&D vendors in Virginia, this high rate of single-offer competition is likely masking 
contracts that would be more properly classified as noncompetitive. 
Tracing the Influence of Study Variables Using a Bayesian Model 
For predictive analysis via regression to be most effective, it is important to 
understand the causal mechanisms’ underlying analysis. For this reason, the study team 
examined each of the variables used in the regression at the contract level. This is done 
using a smaller subset of the FPDS database, six million publicly reported DoD contracts 
that were completed between FY2007 and FY2013. While this population of contracts 
includes fewer years, because the unit of analysis is contracts rather than major commands 
or states, the number of observations is dramatically higher. For similar reasons, the 
effective competition rates are different when calculating by market share of obligations than 
when calculating by number of contracts.  
The process of gathering, cleaning, and organizing the data for the Bayesian network 
is described in greater detail in the CSIS report on fixed-price contracts that is also being 
presented at the 2015 Acquisition Research Symposium. In summary, the study team 
categorized and then collated FPDS data on a contract basis, a process which required 
significant error correction. The end product of this process is 11 evidence nodes, each 
having between two and eight distinct states. The study team then created the Bayesian 
network shown in Figure 1. In that model, an evidence node is a circle, and each arc 
indicates the direction that influence flows. The 11 nodes are described in the following 
section.9  
                                            
 
 
9 See the Fixed Price repository under the CSISdefense GitHub account for the processing code used 
to create the model as well as the data itself. The nature of the Bayesian model is described in 
greater detail in the fixed-price report. 
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 Competition Bayesian Network 
Contract Fundamentals 
These nodes of evidence include both the types of good procured and the platform 
portfolio. The methodological description is adapted from the fixed-price paper, which 
provides greater detail.  
Who (Customer: Army/Navy/Air Force/Other DoD): Determined by the contracting 
office rather than the funding office.  
What (Platform: Air/Land/Vessel/Electronics & Communications/Missiles and 
Space/Weapons and Ammunition/Facility Related Services & Construction/Other): 
Determined by the combination of the claimant program code for the platform when 
available and otherwise via the product or service code.  
PSR (Product/Service/R&D): Determined by the product or service codes, with 
R&D management and support being treated as a service. 
Intl (International: Just U.S./Some International): Based on the place of 
performance. Those contracts with any transactions in foreign countries are treated as 
having transactions with an international place of performance.  
Link (# of linked contracts: none/1–749/750+): This calculated column is the study 
team’s first effort to account for the possibility of problems cascading from other related 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ãW=
`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=`Ü~åÖÉ= - 330 - 
contracts. This is calculated by looking at contracts with the same equipment code or for 
contracts with the same platform portfolio (excluding the FRS&C and other platforms) and 
contracting office, with provisions to avoid double counting or counting contracts from 
different MDAPs. See the Fixed-price repository of the CSISdefense GitHub account for 
processing code used for this calculation.10 
Contract Approach 
These evidence nodes include the contracting methods discussed in earlier sections 
as well as scope-related parameters such as the contract ceiling and the initial duration. The 
regression did consider variables such as average contract size. However, the predictive 
value of contract size is notably more effective at the contract level than when aggregated at 
the state or major command level. 
Comp (Competition: Comp./No Comp.): Is determined using the standard CSIS 
methodology with the critical exception that the numbers of offers received is treated as a 
separate piece of evidence. 
Ceil (Ceiling: $15,000/$100,000/$1,000,000/$30,000,000): Refers to the initial 
ceiling on total potential contract obligations. Is set by the initial base and all options value 
for the contract. This value was chosen rather than the initial base and exercised options 
value because exercising options happens regularly during the course of an on-time and on-
budget contract. 
Dur (Duration: One Day to Two Months/Seven Months to a Year/More than a 
Year): Refers to the duration and is calculated using the number of days between the initial 
effective date and the current completion date for the contract. The ultimate completion date 
is also available but was regularly unlabeled. 
FxCb (Fixed-price or Cost-based): Fixed-price includes all forms of fixed-price 
contracting except fixed-price level of effort. That comparatively rare form has been 
described in meetings with DoD officials as exhibiting more properties of cost-based 
contracts. Cost-based includes all forms of cost-plus contracts as well as time and materials 
and labor hours contracts. 
Indefinite Delivery Vehicle (IDV): Indicates whether or not a contract is one of the 
many forms of Indefinite Delivery Vehicles (IDVs). This is a contracting approach in which a 
single-root contract is used as a basis for multiple other contracts. 
Contract Outcomes  
Offr (Number of Offers Received: 1, 2, 3–4, 5+): This final evidence node is the 
one of most interest to this study. Cases with no competition are categorized as only one 
offer and further details of the calculation of this field are covered in the Fixed-price paper. 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of contracts by number of offers, faceted by the initial 
contract ceiling and use of an indefinite delivery vehicle (IDV). While all five categories show 
a similar broad curve, larger and smaller ceiled contracts do have clearly different patterns. 
There is a large spike at exactly five offers for those contracts with ceilings below $1 million. 
That spike is even more prominent for those with ceilings below $100 thousand. As is shown 
                                            
 
 
10  Available at https://github.com/CSISdefense/Fixed-price  
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by comparing the left and right columns of Figure 2 this phenomenon is entirely driven by 
IDV contracts and given the immediate drop off from five to six contracts, this data would be 
consistent with a widespread coding quirk or a deliberate if not necessarily regulatory target 
for contracting officers dealing with smaller IDVs contracts.  
 
Note. Contracts with more than 50 offers are excluded from the graph. The data in this figure comes from FPDS, 
CSIS analysis. 
 Number of Offers by Ceiling and Vehicle 
By comparison, single-offer competition is prominent in all categories and exceeds 
two offers for contracts with ceilings between $100,000 and $30 million. As is shown in 
Figure 3, this phenomenon is driven first and foremost by definitive contracts and purchase 
orders, which below the $30 million dollar ceiling level consistently has more single-offer 
competition than any other number of offers. On the IDV side, this is only true for contracts 
with ceilings greater than or equal to $1 million. For both categories the median number of 
offers is lowest for contracts with ceilings between $100,000 and $30 million. 
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Note. Contracts with more than 30 offers are excluded from the graph. The mean number of offers for IDV 
contracts with ceilings of $30 million or higher is 33.4 and not depicted on this graph. The data in this figure 
comes from FPDS, CSIS analysis. 
 Box Plot of Number of Offers Received by Ceiling and IDV 
However, above $30 million, single offer drops off as a proportion and upper 
quadrants of the box plot reach their highest values. As depicted on the graph, at least a 
quarter of these large contracts receive more than five offers regardless of vehicle. This 
would be consistent with middle tier contracts sometimes attracting fewer offers when they 
are unappealing or overly fitted for a single vendor. However, once the contracts get above 
the $30 million threshold, vendors appear to be generally more willing to bid even though 
the potential risks are greater in absolute terms. 
As the above summary indicates, the number of offers received varies considerably 
depending on the characteristics of the contract. The patterns of lower competition for 
contracts between $100,000 and $1 million suggests that there is a middle tier of contracts 
which are not so small as to be easily pursued or so large as to be actively enticing to a 
large number of competitors. The strangest finding is the prevalence of five offer competition 
for IDVs, which merits further investigation. 
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Contract-Level Analysis of How the Study Variables Influence Effective Competition 
Type of Good Procured (PSR) 
Services 
For MCCs, increasing contract obligations for services correlate with higher rates of 
effective competition. The correlative strength within the MCC model for services is weak-to-
moderate (p = 0.112547), as is the degree of impact11 (0.2678).  
Overall, 55% of contracts for services in 2014 were awarded after effective 
competition. For Aircraft services, however, that rate was only 36%. By contrast, two of the 
other control variables are associated with significantly higher rates of effective competition 
for services: 66% of services contracts with a large contract ceiling were effective competed, 
while 61% of services contracts structured as IDVs were awarded after effective 
competition. 
Products 
The share of contract obligations for products correlates with lower rates of effective 
competition for states but, does not correlate within the model with rates of effective 
competition as strongly as does the share going to services for MCCs. The reverse was true 
for states. In each case the variable with higher correlation was used. The correlative 
strength within the states model for products is strong (p = 5.95e-06), and its degree of 
impact is moderate (-0.60550).  
Overall, 67% of DoD contracts for products were awarded after effective competition 
in 2014.12 A few of the control variables had notable effects on the rate of effective 
competition for products: only 47% of Aircraft products contracts were awarded after 
effective competition; for products contracts with a contract ceiling over $1 million, 58% of 
were awarded after effective competition; 74% of products contracts that were IDVs were 
awarded after effective competition; and only 42% of products contracts of long duration 
were awarded after effective competition.  
Contracting Methods (IDV) 
IDVs 
Increasing shares of contract obligations awarded under IDV contract types correlate 
with increasing rates of effective competition, but the strength of those correlations is 
notably different between states and MCCs. For states, the correlative strength is strong (p 
= 0.035957), and the degree of impact within the model is mild (0. 30292). For MCCs, the 
correlative strength is significantly weaker (p = 0.456538), and the degree of impact is even 
lower (0.1038). 
Overall, 71% of contracts awarded under IDV contract types in 2014 were effectively 
competed, but association with the control variables had significant effects on rates of 
                                            
 
 
11 The study team uses “degree of impact” to describe the slope of the line resulting from the 
correlative analysis between the specified variable and rates of effective competition within the model. 
12 Note again that this refers to the share of contracts awarded after effective competition, not the 
share of contract obligations. By contract obligations, the rate of effective competition for DoD 
products is consistently well below the rate for services. By contracts, however, the sheer volume of 
smaller contracts for commercial-type products skews the results. 
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effective competition for IDVs. IDVs related to Aircraft (38%), IDVs with large contract 
ceilings (66%), IDVs with ceilings over $1 million (60%), and IDVs of long duration (48%) all 
showed lower rates of effective competition than overall IDVs.  
Platform Portfolios (What) 
Electronics & Communications 
For both states and MCCs, increasing contract obligations related to Electronics & 
Communications (E&C) correlate with lower rates of effective competition, but the strength 
of that correlation differs for states and MCCs. The correlative strength within the model of 
E&C for states is high (p = 0.000840), and the degree of impact is the highest of any 
variable included (-1.40027). For MCCs, by contrast, the correlative strength within the 
model of E&C is relatively weak (p = 0.13066), and the degree of impact is similarly lower   
(-0.123549). This difference between states and MCCs may have two causes. First, if a 
wider number of states do E&C work, that would make the model less dependent on any 
given outlier. Second, for states an interaction variable was included. Electronics and 
communications products were an exception to the negative trend and correlated with 
greater levels of effective competition (p=0.010846), with a high degree of impact (1.80070) 
perhaps because services in electronics and communications are much more technically 
involved. 
Overall, 55% of contracts (not contract obligations) for E&C were awarded after 
effective competition in 2014. Looking at the control variables to see which had a significant 
effect on effective competition rates for E&C, contract ceiling and whether the contract was 
an IDV had virtually no effect. But contracts for E&C of long duration at contract start had an 
effective competition rate of only 46%, likely reflecting contracts with greater complexity that 
fewer companies were willing or able to bid on. 
Aircraft 
The share of contract obligations related to Aircraft strongly correlates with lower 
rates of effective competition for both states and MCCs. For MCCs, the correlative strength 
is high (p = 0.001861), and the degree of impact within the model was moderately high (-
0.4776). For states, the correlative strength was even higher (p = 0.000675), and the degree 
of impact within the model was slightly smaller (-0. 43742). 
In 2014, 46% of contracts related to Aircraft were awarded after effective 
competition. In three cases, the control variables were associated with lower rates of 
effective competition for Aircraft. For Aircraft contracts with a contract ceiling of greater than 
$1 million, the rate of effective competition was only 36%. For Aircraft contracts structured 
as IDVs, only 38% were effectively competed. And for Aircraft contracts of long duration, 
only 34% were awarded after effective competition. 
Missiles and Space 
The share of contract obligations related to Missiles and Space (M&S) is weakly-to-
moderately correlated with lower rates of effective competition for both states and MCCs. 
The correlative strengths were superior for MCCs (p = 0. 836991 for states; p = 0.228995 for 
MCCs) and in the same manner the degree of impact higher for MCCs (-0.1763) than states 
(-0. 05380).  
Overall, 49% of contracts related to M&S in 2014 were awarded after effective 
competition. Looking at the interaction between M&S and the control variables, only 40% of 
M&S contracts with large contract ceilings were awarded after effective competition. By 
contrast, 54% of M&S contracts of long duration were awarded after effective competition. 
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Ships 
The share of contract obligations related to Ships did not notably correlate with rates 
of effective competition for MCCs and showed a weak-to-moderate correlation with lower 
rates of effective competition for states. The correlative strength of Ships for ships 
(0.690506) is slightly higher than for M&S, although the degree of impact within the model 
(0.06109) is minimal. Due to the surprising sign of the correlation and the weak significance, 
this variable may not merit inclusion in future iterations of the model. 
Overall, 46% of contracts related to Ships were awarded after effective competition 
in 2014. Several of the control variables are associated with notably different rates of 
effective competition for Ships. 69% of Ships contracts with large ($30 million or higher) 
contract ceilings were awarded after effective competition. Meanwhile, 53% of Ships 
contracts with a contract ceiling over $1 million saw effective competition. Similarly, 52% of 
Ships contracts awarded under IDVs were awarded after effective competition. By contrast, 
only 26% of Ships contracts of long duration were effectively competed. 
Weapons and Ammunition 
The share of contract obligations related to Weapons and Ammunition (W&A) 
showed weak with lower shares of effective competition for MCCs. For MCCs, the 
correlative strength was notably weaker (p = 0.457136), but the degree of impact within the 
model was the highest of any single variable (-0.5896). 
Overall, 57% of contracts related to W&A were awarded after effective competition in 
2014. The only control variable that had a significant impact in association with W&A was 
long duration—W&A contracts of long duration were effectively competed only 52% of the 
time.  
Initial Results and Next Steps 
Due to the previously-mentioned limitations inherent in this iteration of the model, it 
bears repeating that these initial results from the predictive model are not intended to be 
used to “grade” states and MCCs on their performance in promoting effective competition. 
The study team suspects that the relatively small amount of obligations in some of these 
states and MCCs may result in one or two large contracts skewing effective competition 
rates. Nonetheless, the initial results validate the ability of the model to identify states/MCCs 
where rates of effective competition for a segment of the contracting portfolio differ 
significantly from the rates for the overall DoD. In addition there are a number of interesting 
results, such as MCCs with a mix of product and service contracts having lower effective 
competition rates and states with a focus in products and electronics having higher rates. 
This is particularly important given how stable rates of effective competition have 
been for the DoD overall, and for DoD products/services/R&D, respectively. If gains are to 
be made in promoting effective competition, it will have to be at a more granular level, taking 
examples from states/MCCs that have shown better than “estimated” rates of effective 
competition and trying to apply lessons learned to those with lower than ”estimated” rates of 
competition. If nothing else, the study team hopes to provide policy-makers with a road map 
that will enable them to identify which states and MCCs warrant deeper analysis and to 
determine if their competition performance is an artifact of a few big contracts skewing 
results, or rather a systemic characteristic that should either be studied and emulated or 
studied and improved. 
In an effort to both explain a greater amount of the noted variance and to reduce the 
size of the 95% confidence interval that we obtain, the CSIS study team is presently 
experimenting with ways to improve both the statistical foundations and the robustness of 
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the predictive model. The results of these explorations will also enable the study team to 
determine if additional variables will be incorporated into the model. Based on the output 
from the current version of the model, the study team has already determined to include a 
more detailed breakdown of services; this will help account for the states and MCCs that 
show large discrepancies between “estimated” and actual effective competition rates due to 
higher/lower rates for particular types of services. 
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